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Abstract
It is common in instrumental variable studies for instrument values to be missing,
for example when the instrument is a genetic test in Mendelian randomization studies.
In this paper we discuss two apparent paradoxes that arise in so-called single consent
designs where there is one-sided noncompliance, i.e., where unencouraged units can-
not access treatment. The first paradox is that, even under a missing completely at
random assumption, a complete-case analysis is biased when knowledge of one-sided
noncompliance is taken into account; this is not the case when such information is
disregarded. This occurs because incorporating information about one-sided noncom-
pliance induces a dependence between the missingness and treatment. The second
paradox is that, although incorporating such information does not lead to efficiency
gains without missing data, the story is different when instrument values are missing:
there, incorporating such information changes the efficiency bound, allowing possible
efficiency gains. This is because some of the missing values can be filled in, based
on the fact that anyone who received treatment must have been encouraged by the
instrument (since the unencouraged cannot access treatment).
Keywords: causal inference, efficiency theory, encouragement design, instrumental variable,
observational study.
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1 Introduction
Instrumental variable methods are a popular approach to causal inference in settings where
unmeasured variables confound the relationship between the treatment and outcome of
interest. In general, such unmeasured confounding precludes identification of causal effects,
and one must resort to bounds and/or sensitivity analysis. However, in the presence of an
instrument some progress can still be made. An instrument is a special variable that affects
receipt of treatment but does not directly affect outcomes, and is itself unconfounded. This
setup can be represented graphically as in Figure 1; formal identifying assumptions are given
in the next section.
Z A Y
U
Figure 1: Directed acyclic graph showing instrument Z, treatment A, outcome Y , and
unmeasured variables U . Gray dotted arrows indicate relationships that are assumed absent
by identifying assumptions.
A classic example of an instrument occurs in randomized trials with noncompliance,
in which case the assigned treatment is often a reasonable instrument for effects of the
treatment that was actually received. Instrumental variable methods have been around for
nearly a century (Wright 1928; Wright 1934), but their placement in a formal potential out-
comes framework occurred only relatively recently (Angrist et al. 1996). Examples abound
in the literature, including instruments based on distance, treatment provider preference,
calendar time, and genetic variants; we refer to Herna´n & Robins (2006) and Baiocchi et al.
(2014) for overviews.
Although there is an extensive literature on instrumental variables, the treatment of
missing data in such settings is scant. Apart from a few recent exceptions (Burgess et al.
2011; Mogstad & Wiswall 2012; Chaudhuri & Guilkey 2016; Kennedy 2018) this problem
has not received much attention, despite the fact that missing data is very common in
instrumental variable studies. For example, Mendelian randomization studies use genetic
variants as instruments, but this information is frequently missing due to subjects not
sending in samples, or ambiguous output from genotyping platforms. Burgess et al. (2011)
reported missingness in SNP-based instruments ranging between 2% and 11%; more ex-
amples can be found in Mogstad & Wiswall (2012) and Chaudhuri & Guilkey (2016). In
this paper we consider instrumental variable studies with instrument missingness, and also
where noncompliance is one-sided, i.e., where unencouraged units cannot access treatment.
One-sided noncompliance common in practice, occurring for example in studies of new
drugs not yet on market, and of limited-access job training programs. Although one-sided
noncompliance is often associated with experiments, it also occurs in observational studies
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where missing instrument values are common (Fro¨lich & Melly 2013; Kennedy 2018).
For example, missing instrument data and one-sided noncompliance often arise together
in fuzzy regression discontinuity designs; these are instrumental variable analyses where the
instrument is an indicator for being above a treatment-influencing threshold (Hahn et al.
2001; Imbens & Lemieux 2008). For instance, Pitt & Khandker (1998) and Fro¨lich & Melly
(2013) discuss a study of the effects of microcredit programs in Bangladesh, where the
instrument was an indicator for owning more than half an acre of land; those with more
than half an acre were ineligible for the program, while those with less self-selected in. Pitt
& Khandker (1998) reported a “substantial number” of missing instrument values. Battistin
& Rettore (2008) give several similar examples, including studies where the instrument is
an indicator for being above a test score cutoff. Students below the cutoff may be restricted
from enrollment (e.g., in college programs), whereas students above get to choose whether
to participate; and test scores are often missing. Angrist & Rokkanen (2015) used such
an instrument to study the effect of education at Boston’s selective “exam schools”; they
mentioned excluding any subjects with missing test scores.
In this paper we discuss two paradoxes that arise in these kinds of instrumental variable
studies with missing instrument values and one-sided noncompliance. The first paradox
is that, even under a missing completely at random assumption, a complete-case analysis
is biased when knowledge of one-sided noncompliance is taken into account. Surprisingly,
this is not the case when such information is disregarded: so discarding information avoids
bias. The second paradox is that, although incorporating information about one-sided
noncompliance does not lead to efficiency gains without missing data, the story is different
when instrument values are missing: there, incorporating such information changes the
efficiency bound, allowing possible efficiency gains. Before describing these paradoxes we
first present some general efficiency theory for instrumental variable studies with missing
instrument values.
2 Setup & notation
Suppose the full data would consist of a sample of observations O∗ = (Z,A, Y ) with Z a
binary instrument (e.g., a randomization indicator in experimental settings), A a binary
treatment, and Y some real-valued outcome. Starting in Section 4, we consider studies
with one-sided noncompliance, in which Z = 0 implies A = 0, i.e., control subjects cannot
access treatment. Such studies are sometimes referred to as “single consent designs” (Zelen
1979).
Unfortunately, however, we do not observe the full data; instead we observe a sample
of independent and identically distributed observations (O1, ...,On), where
O = (RZ,R,A, Y ) ∼ P
and R is an indicator of whether the instrument Z is observed or not. When R = 1 the
instrument Z is observed, but when R = 0 the instrument Z is missing and we only see
RZ = 0 regardless of the value of Z. To focus ideas and simplify notation, we do not
consider baseline covariates; however extensions are mostly straightforward (alternatively,
all results can be viewed as implicitly conditional on any such covariates).
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Our goal is to estimate the classical instrumental variable estimand
Ψf ≡ Ψf(P) = E(Y | Z = 1)− E(Y | Z = 0)
E(A | Z = 1)− E(A | Z = 0) , (1)
which equals a treatment effect under standard causal assumptions. (Note that expecta-
tions E = EP are under the true P, and likewise for Ψ
f = Ψf(P) unless stated otherwise).
These assumptions have been detailed at length elsewhere (Angrist et al. 1996; Herna´n &
Robins 2006), so we will limit our discussion of them before focusing on the observed data
parameter Ψf above. We also note that all subsequent results hold for the observed data
parameter Ψf , regardless of whether the causal assumptions are plausible or not.
We let Ya denote the potential outcome (Rubin 1974) that would have been observed
had treatment been set to A = a; thus the goal is to learn about the distribution of the
effect Ya=1 − Ya=0. We will also need to define potential outcomes under interventions on
the instrument; thus let Yza denote the potential outcome that would have been observed
under both Z = z and A = a, and similarly let Az and Yz = YzAz denote the potential
treatment and outcome under only Z = z.
To illustrate one set of assumptions under which the observed data parameter Ψf(P)
represents a causal effect, consider the following.
Assumption 1 (Consistency). Y = Yz and A = Az if Z = z, and Y = Yza if (Z,A) = (z, a).
Assumption 2 (Positivity). 0 < P(Z = z) < 1.
Assumption 3 (Instrumentation). P(Az=1 = 1) 6= P(Az=0 = 1).
Assumption 4 (Unconfoundedness of Z). Z ⊥⊥ (Az, Yz).
Assumption 5 (Exclusion Restriction). Yza = Ya.
Assumption 6 (Monotonicity). Az=1 ≥ Az=0.
Consistency means we get to observe potential outcomes (and treatments) under the
observed instrument values; this requires there to be no interference, i.e., one subject’s
treatments and outcomes cannot be affected by other subjects’ instrument values or treat-
ments. This would be violated in for example vaccine studies with herd immunity, or
studies with strong network structure. Positivity requires everyone to have some chance
at each instrument value. Instrumentation means the instrument has to have some effect
on treatment; in other words, the arrow from Z to A in Figure 1 must be present. Un-
confoundedness means the instrument must be assigned essentially at random, i.e., the
arrow from U to Z in Figure 1 must be absent. The exclusion restriction says that the
instrument can only affect outcomes indirectly through treatment, i.e., the arrow from Z
to Y in Figure 1 must be absent. Monotonicity means there are no “defiers” who take
treatment when not encouraged to by the instrument, but take control when encouraged
towards treatment. Note that monotonicity holds by design with one-sided noncompliance,
since then Az=0 = 0 so we have Az=1 > Az=0 if and only if Az=1 = 1.
The next lemma recalls a result from Imbens & Angrist (1994) showing that under
the above assumptions, Ψf equals a “local” average treatment effect among compliers, i.e.,
among those who take treatment only when encouraged to do so by the instrument.
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Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1–6, the average treatment effect among compliers with
Az=1 > Az=0 is given by
Ψf = E(Ya=1 − Ya=0 | Az=1 > Az=0)
with Ψf defined in (1).
Proof. This result follows from Imbens & Angrist (1994) and Angrist et al. (1996). Note
E(Y | Z = 1)− E(Y | Z = 0) = E(Yz=1 − Yz=0) = E(Ya=Az=1 − Ya=Az=0)
= E{(Ya=1 − Ya=0)1(Az=1 > Az=0)}
= E(Ya=1 − Ya=0 | Az=1 > Az=0)P(Az=1 > Az=0) (2)
where the first equality follows from consistency, positivity, and unconfoundedness, the
second by consistency and the exclusion restriction, and the third by monotonicity. Now
P(Az=1 > Az=0) = E(Az=1 − Az=0) = E(A | Z = 1)− E(A | Z = 0) (3)
where the first equality follows by monotonicity, and the second by consistency, positivity,
and unconfoundedness. Finally, to obtain the result we divide (2) by (3), which requires
the instrumentation assumption.
We note that the observed data quantity Ψf can also represent a causal effect under
alternative assumptions. For example, monotonicity is sometimes replaced with effect
homogeneity assumptions, in which case Ψf can equal the average effect in the entire
population (Angrist et al. 1996) or among the treated (Herna´n & Robins 2006).
3 Preliminaries
In this section we present some general efficiency theory for instrumental variable studies
(not necessarily with one-sided noncompliance) with missing instrument values. In partic-
ular we first present the nonparametric efficiency bounds for Ψf without any missingness,
then go on to present the efficiency bound under missing at random assumptions, describe
the corresponding efficiency loss, and then analyze the efficiency of a complete-case esti-
mator under a missing completely at random assumption.
3.1 Efficiency bound without missingness
With full data (i.e., when R = 1 with probability one and Z is always observed), the usual
instrumental variable estimator is
Ψf(Pn) =
Pn(ZY )− Pn(Z)Pn(Y )
Pn(ZA)− Pn(Z)Pn(A) (4)
where Pn is the empirical measure, so that sample averages can be written using the
shorthand n−1
∑
i f(Oi) = Pn{f(O)}. It is straightforward to see that this estimator
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solves the equation Pn{(Z− π̂n)(Y −ψA)} = 0 in ψ for π̂n = Pn(Z), so that using standard
estimating equation results we have
Ψf (Pn)−Ψf = Pn{D(O)}+ oP(1/
√
n)
where
D(O) =
{Z − E(Z)}{(Y −ΨfA)− E(Y −ΨfA)}
Cov(Z,A)
. (5)
The next result gives the efficiency bound in this full data setting.
Lemma 2. Suppose the instrument Z is always observed. Then the nonparametric effi-
ciency bound for Ψf is given by
Var
[{Z − E(Z)}{(Y −ΨfA)− E(Y −ΨfA)}
Cov(Z,A)
]
.
Proof. Since the full data model is nonparametric, the tangent space is equal to the entire
Hilbert space of mean-zero finite-variance functions (Bickel et al. 1993; van der Laan &
Robins 2003; Tsiatis 2006); therefore D is the only influence function and necessarily the
efficient one. This immediately implies that its variance is the efficiency bound.
3.2 Efficiency bound under MCAR & MAR
Now consider the case where Z can be missing, with R an indicator for whether Z is
observed, and assume the “missing completely at random” (MCAR) condition
R ⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y ).
This means the missingness in Z is completely unrelated to not only the underlying Z
values, but also treatment and outcome.
The next result gives the efficiency bound in this missing at random setting. In Section
4.1 we use this result to construct an estimator whose asymptotic variance matches the
bound under weak conditions.
Lemma 3. Suppose R ⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y ) so that the instrument Z is missing completely at
random. Then the efficiency bound for Ψf is given by the variance of
D∗(O) =
R
E(R | A, Y )
[
D(O)− E{D(O) | A, Y,R = 1}
]
+ E{D(O) | A, Y,R = 1}, (6)
which can be expressed as
Var{D∗(O)} = Var{D(O)}
E(R)
− P(R = 0)
P(R = 1)
Var
[
E{D(O) | A, Y }
]
. (7)
Further, the efficiency bound is the same under the weaker missing at random condition
R ⊥⊥ Z | A, Y .
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Proof. From Robins & Rotnitzky (1995), efficiency bounds under MCAR (here, R ⊥⊥
(Z,A, Y )) are the same as those under a weaker missing at random (MAR) condition
R ⊥⊥ Z | A, Y , which is implied by MCAR. Therefore applying their theory (also detailed
by Tsiatis (2006)) to our setting yields an efficient influence function under both MAR and
MCAR given by
D∗(O) =
R
E(R | A, Y )
[
D(O)− E{D(O) | A, Y,R = 1}
]
+ E{D(O) | A, Y,R = 1}.
Note that E(R | A, Y ) = E(R) under MCAR, and the conditioning on R = 1 in the two
rightmost terms is unnecessary (under both MCAR and MAR). Hence the efficiency bound
under MCAR is given by
Var{D∗(O)} = E
[(
R
E(R)
[
D(O)− E{D(O) | A, Y }
]
+ E{D(O) | A, Y }
)2]
= E
(
R
E(R)2
[
D(O)− E{D(O) | A, Y }
]2
+ E{D(O) | A, Y }2
)
=
1
E(R)
E
[
Var{D(O) | A, Y }
]
+ Var
[
E{D(O) | A, Y }
]
=
Var{D(O)}
E(R)
− P(R = 0)
P(R = 1)
Var
[
E{D(O) | A, Y }
]
.
where the third and fourth equalities follow from R ⊥⊥ (A, Y ) and 0 = E{D(O)} =
E[E{D(O) | A, Y }].
After some rearranging, the result in Lemma 3 shows that the relative efficiency under
MCAR versus the full data setting is
Var{D∗(O)}
Var{D(O)} = 1 + odds(R = 0)
E[Var{D(O) | A, Y }]
Var{D(O)} .
Therefore full data efficiency is only attainable under MCAR in unusual no-variance situ-
ations: if Z is constant within strata of (A, Y ), or if (Y −ΨfA) is constant.
3.3 Complete-case efficiency under MCAR
Under MCAR, a complete-case analysis that simply discards observations with R = 0
and applies the usual estimator will be valid. Here we describe the efficiency of such an
approach.
Specifically, the complete-case version of the instrumental variable estimand presented
in the previous subsection is given by
Ψcc(P) =
E(Y | Z = 1, R = 1)− E(Y | Z = 0, R = 1)
E(A | Z = 1, R = 1)− E(A | Z = 0, R = 1) (8)
and we have
Ψf(P) = Ψcc(P)
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by the MCAR condition. The complete-case estimator is then given by
Ψcc(Pn) =
Pn(RZY )Pn(R)− Pn(RZ)Pn(RY )
Pn(RZA)Pn(R)− Pn(RZ)Pn(RA) .
This estimator solves Pn{R(Z − π̂n)(Y − ψA)} = 0 in ψ for for π̂n = Pn(Z | R = 1) =
Pn(RZ)/Pn(R), and thus using standard estimating equation results as before (together
with the fact that R ⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y )), it is straightforward to show that
Ψcc(Pn)−Ψf = Pn
{
R
E(R)
D(O)
}
+ oP(1/
√
n).
Therefore since R ⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y ) the asymptotic variance (aVar) of the complete-case esti-
mator is
aVar {Ψcc(Pn)} = Var
{
R
E(R)
D(O)
}
=
Var{D(O)}
E(R)
=
aVar
{
Ψf(Pn)
}
E(R)
so that the relative efficiency aVar {Ψcc(Pn)}/aVar
{
Ψf (Pn)
}
is the inverse proportion of
units not missing 1/E(R) = 1/P(R = 1). This is to be expected: since the complete-case
estimator only uses units with R = 1, it requires 1/P(R = 1) times as many observations to
match the efficiency attainable without missingness (for example, one would need a sample
size twice as large if half the units have missing data).
Further, comparison with the efficiency bound from Lemma 3 shows that the complete-
case estimator is generally inefficient, since its asymptotic variance (the first term on the
right-hand side of (7)) is strictly greater than the efficiency bound (the left-hand side of
(7)) unless E{D(O) | A, Y } is constant (hence, the second term on the right-hand side of
(7) is zero).
4 First paradox
Now that we have characterized the efficiency theory for instrumental variable studies under
the MCAR condition R ⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y ), we will present our first (apparent) paradox that arises
when noncompliance is one-sided. Namely, we will show that, even assuming the MCAR
condition, a complete-case analysis is generally biased when one-sided noncompliance is
taken into account. More specifically, incorporating the fact that noncompliance is one-
sided generates a new missingness indicator, for which MCAR (but not MAR) is violated.
4.1 Main result
As mentioned in Section 2, one-sided noncompliance means the unencouraged with Z = 0
do not have access to treatment, so that Z = 0 implies A = 0, i.e., Az=0 = 0 and A = 1
implies Z = 1. Equivalently, in such studies there are only never-takers (Az = 0) and
compliers (Az = z), and no always-takers (Az = 1) or defiers (Az = 1 − z). In this section
we show that incorporating information about one-sided noncompliance invalidates MCAR
so that a complete-case analysis is biased.
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Before stating our first result we introduce some new notation. Since A = 1 implies
Z = 1 under one-sided noncompliance, whenever Z is missing for subjects with A = 1 we
can actually fill in Z = 1. This yields a new missingness indicator, different from R, defined
by
R† = R(1−A) + A (9)
which equals the initial missingness indicator R whenever A = 0, but equals 1 whenever
A = 1 since then it is known that Z = 1. We also define the corresponding complete-case
estimand based on this updated indicator as
Ψ†(P) =
E(Y | Z = 1, R† = 1)− E(Y | Z = 0, R† = 1)
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1)− E(A | Z = 0, R† = 1) (10)
The next theorem gives our first main result, which is that incorporating information
about one-sided noncompliance violates MCAR and thus generally invalidates a complete-
case analysis, even though without incorporating such information MCAR in fact holds
and a complete-case analysis would be valid.
Theorem 1. Let O = (R,RZ,A, Y ) ∼ P and suppose the MCAR condition R ⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y )
holds, so that
Ψf(P) = Ψcc(P)
for Ψf and Ψcc the full-data and complete-case instrumental variable estimands in (1) and
(8). When there is one-sided noncompliance and P(R = 1) < 1, then MCAR fails for the
updated indicator R† from (9) which incorporates the knowledge that A = 1 implies Z = 1,
i.e.,
R† 6⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y )
and in general a complete-case analysis based on R† will be biased, i.e.,
Ψf (P) 6= Ψ†(P).
Proof. In the next subsection we will derive the explicit form of the bias of the complete-
case estimand based on R†, proving the second result. To see why R† 6⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y ) for the
first result, note that R† 6⊥⊥ A due to the fact that
P(R† = 1 | A = 1) = 1
P(R† = 1 | A = 0) = P(R = 1 | A = 0) = P(R = 1),
and these expressions are not equal unless there is no missingness.
The result in Theorem 1 is counterintuitive at first glance: if we use the original missing-
ness indicator R and pretend not to know about one-sided noncompliance, then a complete-
case analysis is valid; however if we take into account this latter information using R†, then
we cannot do a complete-case analysis anymore. The main intuition for this result is that,
even if the instrument is initially missing completely at random (using the indicator R),
incorporating the one-sided noncompliance information induces a dependence between the
new indicator R† and treatment A, since A = 1 implies Z = 1 and thus R† = 1. This inval-
idates MCAR and instead makes the instrument missing at random (but not completely).
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Remark 1. In a setting with baseline covariates W, the results of Theorem 1 indicate that
a W-specific MAR condition is violated for the indicator R†, i.e., R† 6⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y ) | W,
even when it holds for the original indicator R, i.e., even if R ⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y ) |W.
Remark 2. Although MCAR is violated when using R†, MAR still holds; more specifically
we have R† ⊥⊥ (Z, Y ) | A. This follows since if A = 1 then R† = 1 is constant, and if A = 0
then R† = R, which is independent of (Z, Y ).
Theorem 1 therefore tells us that, in studies with one-sided noncompliance and missing
instrument values, one should either not use complete-case analyses (or analogous methods
in settings with covariates) or else one should not incorporate the one-sided noncompliance
information. In our view it is preferable to assume minimal untestable MAR conditions like
R ⊥⊥ Z | (A, Y ), since this holds for both R and R†, instead of stronger MCAR conditions
like R ⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y ), which incorporate testable constraints (R ⊥⊥ (A, Y )) and require
different analysis methods depending on whether one-sided noncompliance information is
taken into account. This is especially prudent since efficiency bounds are the same under
both MAR and MCAR; thus the benefits of MCAR assumptions do not include efficiency
gains, but in fact just less computational burden (e.g., allowing complete-case analysis).
Thus, we advocate for an estimator that can attain the MCAR/MAR efficiency bound
under weak conditions. One such estimator is given by
Ψ̂n =
Pn([
R†
Ê(R†|A,Y )
{Z − Ê(Z | A, Y,R† = 1)}+ Ê(Z | A, Y,R† = 1)]{Y − Pn(Y )})
Pn([
R†
Ê(R†|A,Y )
{Z − Ê(Z | A, Y,R† = 1)}+ Ê(Z | A, Y,R† = 1)]{A− Pn(A)})
(11)
where Ê(R† | A, Y ) and Ê(Z | A, Y,R† = 1) are estimates of the missingness propensity
score and instrument regression, respectively. For discrete Y , these nuisance functions can
be based on saturated models, in which case a standard analysis shows that the estimator
attains the efficiency bound under no conditions as long as E(R† | A, Y ) and its estimator
are bounded away from zero. For continuous Y , construction of these estimators would
require some smoothing, and a sufficient condition for asymptotic efficiency would be that
the estimators achieve faster than n−1/4 rates (e.g., in L2 norm). The estimator Ψ̂n can
be viewed as solving an estimating equation based on an estimated version of the efficient
influence function in (6) (with R† replacing R). This is a standard way to construct
efficient estimators, and the analysis of corresponding asymptotic properties follows from
usual estimating equation techniques (van der Vaart 2000; van der Laan & Robins 2003).
4.2 Explicit form for bias
In this subsection we explore the form of the bias of a complete-case approach using the
indicator R†, in the presence of one-sided noncompliance.
Lemma 4. Under MCAR (R ⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y )) the bias of Ψ† from (10) is given by
Ψ†(P)−Ψf(P) = (αβ) P(R
† = 0 | Z = 1)
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1)
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for
α = E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1)− E(A | Z = 1, R† = 0)
β = E(Y | Z = 1, A = 1)− E(Y | Z = 1, A = 0)−Ψf(P).
A proof of Lemma 1 is given in the Appendix. This result indicates that as long as
there is missingness, i.e., P(R† = 0 | Z = 1) > 0, then there are two scenarios in studies
with one-sided noncompliance in which it is valid to do a complete-case analysis (using the
indicator R†):
1. Among those encouraged towards treatment (Z = 1), compliance (A = 1) rates are
the same regardless of whether the instrument is missing or not (i.e., α = 0).
2. The mean treatment-control difference in outcomes among those encouraged towards
treatment (Z = 1) is equal to the instrumental variable effect Ψf (i.e., β = 0).
In general these two no-bias conditions would not be expected to hold. The first condi-
tion (involving α) cannot be tested since Z is unobserved when R† = 0. However the second
condition could be assessed (assuming MAR) by estimating Ψf under MAR and comparing
to the mean treatment-control difference among those encouraged towards treatment with
R† = 1. Alternatively, to assess bias apart from these conditions, one could simply compare
estimates under MCAR and MAR directly.
5 Second paradox
In this section we present our second apparent paradox: that, although knowing noncompli-
ance is one-sided does not yield efficiency gains with full non-missing data, such knowledge
is in fact informative in settings with missing data. In particular we characterize the change
in the efficiency bound that results from exploiting knowledge of one-sided compliance.
5.1 Efficiency bound without missingness
Recall from Section 3.1 that the full data efficient influence function is D(O) from (5),
which is also the influence function for the usual IV estimator Ψf (Pn) from (4). This can
be shown to yield the full data efficiency bound
Var{D(O)} =
∑
z Var(Y −ΨfA | Z = z)/P(Z = z)
{E(A | Z = 1)− E(A | Z = 0)}2 .
Now suppose a known compliance rate E(A | Z = 0) = ρ among the unencouraged, for
some known value 0 ≤ ρ < 1 − ǫ. For example ρ = 0 corresponds to the one-sided non-
compliance scenario in which Z = 0 implies A = 0. Then we can define the corresponding
estimand
Ψfρ(P) =
E(Y | Z = 1)− E(Y | Z = 0)
E(A | Z = 1)− ρ
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with efficient estimator
Ψfρ(Pn) =
Pn(Y | Z = 1)− Pn(Y | Z = 0)
Pn(A | Z = 1)− ρ =
[
1
Ψf (Pn)
+
Pn{(A− ρ)(1− Z)Pn(Z)}
Pn(ZY )− Pn(Z)Pn(Y
]−1
.
This estimator Ψfρ(Pn) can be shown to solve the equation
Pn
(
(Z − π̂n)
[
Y − ψ){ZA+ (1− Z)ρ}
])
= 0
in ψ for π̂n = Pn(Z), rather than the equation Pn{(Z − π̂n)(Y − ψA)} = 0 solved by the
standard estimator Ψf (Pn). Although not the case for general ρ > 0, when ρ = 0 exactly
we have Ψfρ(Pn) = Ψ
f(Pn), so that there is no efficiency gain from incorporating knowledge
of one-sided noncompliance. This follows since ZA + (1 − Z)ρ = ZA = A when ρ = 0,
so that incorporating the knowledge that ρ = 0 yields the exact same estimator as if the
knowledge was not used. This is to be expected, since if E(A | Z = 0) = 0 exactly then the
estimator Pn(A | Z = 0) = Pn{A(1 − Z)}/Pn(1 − Z) will equal the true parameter ρ = 0
with probability one (of course the converse is not true: if Pn(A | Z = 0) = 0 we cannot
be certain that ρ = 0).
Therefore, when there is no missing data, incorporating knowledge of one-sided non-
compliance (or, in other words, ρ = 0) simply yields the same standard estimator that does
not incorporate this knowledge, and hence does not give any efficiency gains. However, in
the next subsection we will show that the story is different when there is missing data (and
MCAR holds for the original missingness indicator R): then using such knowledge can in
fact provide efficiency gains.
5.2 Main result
Here we show our second apparently paradoxical result: that knowledge of one-sided non-
compliance gives opportunities for efficiency gains when instrument values are missing,
contrary to the setting without such missing data. This follows because the knowledge
that A = 1 implies Z = 1 allows us to fill in some missing data (among those with A = 1).
Theorem 2. Assume the MCAR condition R ⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y ). Then the efficiency bound
Var{D∗(O)} for estimating Ψf is no less than the bound Var{Dos(O)} when it is also
known that noncompliance is one-sided. In particular the difference between the bounds is
Var{D∗(O)} − Var{Dos(O)} = odds(R = 0)E
[
Var{D(O) | A, Y }
∣∣∣ A = 1]P(A = 1) ≥ 0.
Proof. As noted in Remark 2 we have that R ⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y ) implies R† ⊥⊥ (Z, Y ) | A.
Therefore, as in Section 3.3 the efficiency bounds are equivalent under R† ⊥⊥ (Z, Y ) | A
and R† ⊥⊥ Z | (A, Y ) (Robins & Rotnitzky 1995). This implies the efficient influence
function under R ⊥⊥ (Z,A, Y ) with known one-sided noncompliance is given by
Dos(O) =
R†
E(R† | A, Y )
[
D(O)− E{D(O) | A, Y,R† = 1}
]
+ E{D(O) | A, Y,R† = 1}
=
R†
E(R† | A)
[
D(O)− E{D(O) | A, Y }
]
+ E{D(O) | A, Y }
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where we note that E{D(O) | A, Y,R† = 1} = E{D(O) | A, Y } follows from the fact that
R† ⊥⊥ Z | (A, Y ), which is implied by R† ⊥⊥ (Z, Y ) | A. Therefore the variance of the
efficient influence function (which by definition is the efficiency bound) is
Var{Dos(O)} = E
(
R†
E(R† | A)2
[
D(O)− E{D(O) | A, Y }
]2
+ E{D(O) | A, Y }2
)
= E
[
Var{D(O) | A, Y }
E(R† | A)
]
+ Var
[
E{D(O) | A, Y }
]
= Var{D(O)}+ E
[
P(R† = 0 | A)
P(R† = 1 | A)Var{D(O) | A, Y }
]
= Var{D(O)}+ odds(R = 0)E
[
(1− A)Var{D(O) | A, Y }
]
.
The first equality follows since the cross term in the variance is zero by iterated expectation,
the second by iterated expectation and since E[E{D(O) | A, Y }] = 0, the third using the
law of total variance, and the fourth using the definition of R†. Rearranging the last line
yields the result.
Theorem 2 shows that, in general, efficiency gains are possible when Z is partially
missing by incorporating knowledge of one-sided noncompliance. The only ways the bounds
Var{D∗(O)} and Var{Dos(O)} can be equal are in the two unusual no-variance situations
mentioned in Section 3.3, or if no one is treated (i.e., there are only never-takers). This is
different from the setting without missing data, where such efficiency gains are not possible;
there knowledge of one-sided noncompliance leads to the exact same estimators that would
be used without such knowledge. The intuition behind the gain in efficiency comes from
the fact that knowledge of one-sided noncompliance allows us to fill in some missing data;
in particular we know that those who are treated must have had missing instruments equal
to Z = 1, since those with Z = 0 cannot access treatment. This also explains why the
increase in efficiency is proportional to the fraction treated P(A = 1).
6 Discussion
In this paper we discussed two paradoxes related to bias and efficiency in instrument vari-
able studies, in the common setting where instrument values are partially missing, and non-
compliance is one-sided. Our first paradox is that complete-case analyses are biased, even
when values are missing completely at random, if knowledge of one-sided noncompliance
is taken into account. This is because incorporating one-sided noncompliance information
(by filling in Z = 1 whenever A = 1) induces a dependence between missingness and treat-
ment, invalidating MCAR and thus a complete-case analysis. Our second paradox is that
incorporating information about one-sided noncompliance generally also leads to efficiency
gains (i.e., the efficiency bound changes) when there is missing data, but not when no
data are missing. This second result is due to the fact that the one-sided noncompliance
allows us to fill in some missing values (again since we know Z = 1 whenever A = 1), thus
alleviating some of the information loss due to missing instrument values.
12
We hope our work might spur more research on missingness in instrumental variable
designs, since we have shown that some interesting and unexpected phenomena can arise.
More generally, in the same spirit as van der Laan & Robins (2003), we also hope our paper
becomes part of a larger stream of work that gives a more connected and simultaneous
treatment of causal inference and missing data problems, since issues related to both often
occur together in practice.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First note that the true IV estimand simplifies to
Ψf =
E(Y | Z = 1)− E(Y | Z = 0)
E(A | Z = 1)
since Z = 0 implies A = 0. This together with R† ⊥⊥ (Z, Y ) | A also implies
E(Y | Z = 0, R† = 1) =
∑
a
E(Y | Z = 0, A = a)P(A = a | Z = 0, R† = 1) = E(Y | Z = 0),
so the complete-case estimand based on R† is similarly given by
Ψ† =
E(Y | Z = 1, R† = 1)− E(Y | Z = 0)
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1) .
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Therefore the bias of Ψ† is
Ψ† −Ψf = E(Y | Z = 1, R
† = 1)− E(Y | Z = 0)
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1) −
E(Y | Z = 1)− E(Y | Z = 0)
E(A | Z = 1)
=
{E(Y | Z = 1, R† = 1)− E(Y | Z = 0)}E(A | Z = 1)
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1)E(A | Z = 1)
− {E(Y | Z = 1)− E(Y | Z = 0)}E(A | Z = 1, R
† = 1)
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1)E(A | Z = 1)
=
E(Y | Z = 1, R† = 1)− E(Y | Z = 1)
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1) + Ψ
f
{
E(A | Z = 1)
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1) − 1
}
=
{
E(Y | Z = 1, A = 1)− E(Y | Z = 1, A = 0)
}
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1)− E(A | Z = 1)
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1)
+ Ψf
{
E(A | Z = 1)
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1) − 1
}
=
{
E(Y | Z = 1, A = 1)− E(Y | Z = 1, A = 0)−Ψf
}
× E(A | Z = 1, R
† = 1)− E(A | Z = 1)
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1)
=
{
E(Y | Z = 1, A = 1)− E(Y | Z = 1, A = 0)−Ψf
}
×
{
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1)− E(A | Z = 1, R† = 0)
}
×
{
P(R† = 0 | Z = 1)
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1)
}
where the first equality follows by expressions for Ψf and Ψ† above, the second by rear-
ranging, the third by subtracting and adding E(Y | Z = 1) in the numerator of the first
term, the fourth since
E(Y | Z = 1, R† = 1)− E(Y | Z = 1)
=
{
E(Y | Z = 1, A = 1)− E(Y | Z = 1, A = 0)
}
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1)
−
{
E(Y | Z = 1, A = 1)− E(Y | Z = 1, A = 0)
}
E(A | Z = 1)
+ E(Y | Z = 1, A = 0)− E(Y | Z = 1, A = 0)
=
{
E(Y | Z = 1, A = 1)− E(Y | Z = 1, A = 0)
}{
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1)− E(A | Z = 1)
}
,
the fifth by rearranging, and the sixth since
E(A | Z = 1) =
{
E(A | Z = 1, R† = 1)− E(A | Z = 1, R† = 0)
}
E(R† | Z = 1)
+ E(A | Z = 1, R† = 0)
and rearranging. This yields the desired result.
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